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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing 
“managerial short-termism” and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential 
institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation 
and find that poor operating performance—decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and 
lower anticipated profitability—is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After 
guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long-term investment once 
managers free themselves from investors’ myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would 
provide more alternative, forward-looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that 
such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of 
guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and 
a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers 
are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their 
investors.  
 
Keywords: earnings guidance, voluntary disclosure, managerial myopia, guidance cessation. 
To Guide or Not to Guide? 
Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance 
 
The law of large numbers has caught up with Dell. Once worshipped for consistent 
performance, Dell has had seven quarters of declining revenue growth and missed its 
own revenue predictions in three of the last four quarters. It finally gave up giving 
quarterly guidance (arguing that its competitors don’t do so either). (Forbes, June 19, 
2006, p. 44). 
1. Introduction 
Quarterly earnings guidance—managers’ public forecasts of forthcoming earnings—is 
widespread yet highly controversial. A recent position paper by the CFA Institute and the 
Business Roundtable emphatically calls on managers to “end the practice of providing quarterly 
earnings guidance” (CFA 2006, p.2). Similarly, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2007) publicly 
implored managers to stop providing quarterly guidance. Arguments for ending the practice of 
guidance are made by purists, who claim that managers should tend to their business and leave 
securities valuation and the underlying forecasts of future performance to investors and analysts, 
and by pragmatists, lawyers in particular, who caution managers that guidance increases 
litigation exposure. Regulators and commentators are often concerned that a previously issued 
forecast will motivate managers to meet the guidance even if doing so would require costly 
changes in real activities, such as cutting capital expenditures or R&D, and sometimes induce 
them to manage earnings toward the forecast (Levitt 2000). And then there is the frequently 
voiced view that issuing quarterly guidance caters to the whims of short-term (myopic) investors, 
driving managers to accommodate these investors by engaging in myopic behavior that sacrifices 
the company’s long-term growth. All in all, concludes the consulting company McKinsey, 
quarterly earnings guidance is “misguided” (Hsieh et al. 2006). The anti-guidance arguments are 
serious indeed. 
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On the pro-guidance side, managers often claim that the practice is necessary to keep 
analysts’ earnings forecasts—issued with or without corporate guidance—within a reasonable 
range to avoid large earnings surprises and the consequent high stock price volatility and 
investors’ heightened risk perceptions (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Janjigian 2003). Researchers note 
that successful guidance—reliable prediction of corporate performance—enhances investor 
confidence in managers’ ability: Successful guiders are obviously “on top of things” (Trueman 
1986). From a conceptual point of view, credible guidance is virtuous because it decreases 
information asymmetry, leading in turn to a lower cost of capital and enhanced corporate 
investment and growth—all good things.  Many managers obviously ascribe to the pro-guidance 
arguments, evidenced by their adherence to this practice. 
To join this conceptually and practically important debate, we empirically examine in this 
study a sample of 222 U.S. firms that ceased to provide quarterly earnings guidance during 2002 
through the first quarter of 2005, after having routinely done so. Only a few of these “stoppers” 
publicly announced and rationalized their decision, whereas the majority just ceased to provide 
guidance. We first examine the determinants of the stopping decision with particular reference to 
the pro and con arguments made by challengers and supporters of the practice. Although 
managers often cite reducing short-termism as the motive for stopping guidance, an unstated 
reason could be poor performance and repeated consensus misses.1 We then examine the post-
stoppage changes in the stoppers’ long-term investments, in their complementary disclosures, 
and in their information environment. 2  
                                                 
1 Identifying the motives for guidance cessation is important. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, aware of the fact 
that some struggling companies (like Dell, above) stopped guidance, urged “a large group of respected companies 
with good performance record” (2007, p.78) to cease guidance in order to avoid the negative signaling by the poor 
performers stopping the practice. 
2 We issue the conventional disclaimer that our tests establish associations and not necessarily causations. We talk 
about “consequences” in the sense that the documented changes in investment, disclosure, and information 
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Using a control sample of 676 guidance “maintainers,” along with the 222 stoppers, we find 
that poor performance is the main reason for guidance cessation. Our stoppers are characterized 
by (1) a decline in earnings before stopping, (2) a poor record of meeting or beating analyst 
consensus forecast, and (3) a deterioration of anticipated earnings. Additionally, we document 
that guidance cessation is associated with (1) a change in top management, likely ushering in 
new management philosophy, (2) a relatively low frequency of guidance by industry peers, and 
(3) past as well as anticipated difficulties in predicting earnings.  
After guidance cessation, with respect to the oft-mentioned argument that quarterly guidance 
elicits short-term managerial behavior, we do not find that guidance stoppers, free of investors’ 
myopic shackles, enhance investment in capital expenditure and research and development 
(R&D).3 In contrast to the statements made by some guidance stoppers and the recommendations 
of the bodies urging companies to cease guidance, we find that stoppers did not enhance, but 
curtail, the disclosure of alternative, forward-looking information. Moreover, we document a 
decrease in analyst coverage and increases in their earnings forecast errors and forecast 
dispersion. The curtailed other forward-looking disclosures and the changes in the quantity and 
quality of analysts’ activities suggest a significant deterioration in the information environment 
of stoppers. All in all, we do not substantiate any of the major benefits claimed for ceasing the 
practice of guidance.4 
Our research contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature in general and to the earnings 
guidance research in particular. To our knowledge, ours is the first study that examines the 
complete sequence of events concerning guidance: from the circumstances prevailing before the 
                                                                                                                                                             
environment occur immediately after stopping guidance, and are relative to firms that continue to provide quarterly 
guidance.   
3 For a subsample of stoppers we find tentative evidence of an R&D increase post-stoppage.   
4 In unreported analysis we use the traditional Heckman two-step selection model (e.g., inverse Mills ratio) to 
examine post-cessation behavior. Our reported results are robust to this specification. 
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stopping decision, through the disclosure change, to the post-changes in real (investment) and 
disclosure decisions.  
Certain issues related to quarterly earnings guidance were examined by two 
contemporaneous studies: Chen et al. (2006), who focus on guidance stoppers which publicly 
announced their decision and primarily examine the circumstances leading these firms to stop 
guidance, and Cheng et al. (2006), who examine the investment decisions of guidance providers 
and non-providers. Our study, we believe, extends significantly these papers and thereby 
contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature. In particular, we differ from Chen et al. (2006) 
in three respects. First, their sample is restricted to firms that have publicly announced the 
decision to stop guidance. We observe in our sample that most stoppers do not make a public 
announcement and that the announcers are different from the non-announcers. Consequently, 
some of our findings differ from Chen et al. For example, we document that after guidance 
cessation, analyst coverage decreases for stoppers without an announcement but not for stoppers 
that publicly announced the decision. This explains their finding of no change in analyst 
coverage after stoppage and also suggests that restricting the sample to announced stoppers 
likely introduces a selection bias.5  
Second, although both Chen et al. and our study find that poor performance is associated 
with guidance cessation, we provide broader and stronger evidence due to our larger sample. 
Even though Chen et al.’s sample period spans over five years, their stopper sample size is 96 
and the useful observations are 75 in testing the determinants of guidance cessation. Their 
conclusion about poor performance is supported by one variable—stock performance—that is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, our conclusions are based on tests using 208 
                                                 
5 On the other hand, focusing on announcers allows Chen et al. to document the market reaction to the 
announcement (it’s negative). 
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stoppers and four performance variables—past earnings change, the consensus meet-or-beat 
record, anticipated earnings change, and stock performance—which are all statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
Third, our analysis of the stoppers’ post-cessation change in forward-looking disclosures is, 
we believe, more comprehensive than is Chen et al. and indeed yields a different conclusion. 
They use word counts in the earnings announcement press release as a proxy for the intensity of 
forward-looking disclosures and conclude that disclosures have increased after guidance 
cessation. Rather than counting words, we code the messages in the forward-looking disclosures 
derived from multiple sources: the earnings announcement press release, the 10-Q MD&A, the 
earnings announcement conference call, and special press releases between earnings 
announcements. Based on the coded disclosures of eight categories, we conclude that, on 
average, guidance stoppers curtailed meaningful forward-looking information after guidance 
cessation. This evidence provides a reliable and powerful check of the claim made by guidance 
detractors that stoppers will replace the guidance with extensive forward-looking information. 
Our evidence refutes this claim. 
The second related study, Cheng et al. (2006), compares a sample of firms that frequently 
provided quarterly guidance with those that only occasionally provided such guidance or did not 
provide guidance at all and conclude that regular guiders had lower R&D than occasional or no-
guiders, implying that guidance contributes to managerial short-termism. A major difference 
between ours and the Cheng et al. study is that our research design—examining firms before and 
after guidance cessation and comparing guidance stoppers with those that maintained 
guidance—uses a stopping firm’s past as its own control. In contrast, comparing guiders with 
non-guiders (Cheng et al.) raises the thorny issue of adequately controlling for all the major 
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factors which affect the investment decision (e.g., management style, shareholder mix, or type of 
analysts following). One can never be sure whether an omitted control variable causes the 
difference in R&D or whether this difference is indeed driven by quarterly guidance. Having a 
stopping firm as its own control mitigates this problem. Moreover, while Cheng et al. examine 
levels, we focus throughout our analysis on changes in the variables—further mitigating the 
omitted variables problem.   
Finally, our study, dealing with voluntary disclosure, is related to Miller (2002) which takes a 
comprehensive look at the voluntary disclosure patterns of firms with changing operating 
performance. Examining a broad range of voluntary disclosures, Miller reports that firms steadily 
increase the level of disclosure during periods of increased earnings, but once earnings begin to 
decline, the level of disclosure reverts to what it was during the initial flat earnings period. Our 
research considers a specific type of disclosure (earnings guidance) for a substantially larger 
number of firms (Miller’s sample size is 80) and in a more recent (and very different) time 
period (Miller’s sample period is 1980-1993). Among our various findings, we do find additional 
support for Miller’s contention that firm disclosure tends to decline in the face of poor 
performance. Our study takes a step beyond Miller’s important findings by examining whether 
the disclosure change (stopping guidance) is associated with real decisions (R&D and capital 
expenditures).   
Our paper’s order of discussion is as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual foundations 
of our study and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and Section 4 
reports on the association between prior performance and quarterly guidance cessation. Section 5 
examines the changes in long-term investments after guidance cessation and Section 6 
investigates whether guidance stoppers enhance alternative disclosures. Section 7 examines the 
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changes in the quantity and quality of analysts’ activities after firms stop guidance. Section 8 
comments on guidance stoppers that resumed guidance. Section 9 concludes the paper.   
2. Conceptual Foundations and Hypotheses Development 
 We examine in this study the links between firm performance and quarterly guidance 
cessation and between this disclosure change and the changes in both real and informational 
decisions:  changes in long-term investment, enhanced alternative disclosure in lieu of guidance, 
and changes in the information environment—analysts’ forecast attributes. 
The relation between firm performance and guidance cessation 
Economic theory and empirical evidence is inconclusive about the relation between firm 
performance and disclosure. The early theoretical studies assume that the benefits of disclosure 
are a function of the nature of news (e.g., good or bad) and largely ignore the costs associated 
with non-disclosure (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988). These studies conclude 
that firms voluntarily disclose information when it is favorable, suggesting a positive association 
between firm performance and disclosure. Including the legal costs of non-disclosure in the 
model, Trueman (1997) demonstrates that firms will voluntarily disclose either good or bad news 
when such news is material. These studies thus argue that disclosure decisions are affected by 
firm performance, but the directional relation is unclear.   
Empirical studies have found that firms make disclosure decisions conditional on 
performance, but the evidence regarding direction has been mixed. Some studies document a 
tendency of firms to issue earnings forecasts when the news is good (Patell 1976; Penman 1980; 
Waymire 1984; Lev and Penman 1990). Miller (2002), discussed above, finds that when earnings 
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decline, firms issue fewer earnings/sales forecasts.6 These studies suggest a positive association 
between performance and voluntary disclosure. Other studies, however, suggest a negative 
association between performance and disclosure. Skinner (1994), and Kasznik and Lev (1995) 
report a higher frequency of bad-news than good-news disclosures. This difference is likely due 
to the increased threat of class-action lawsuits, which are often triggered by a large price decline 
rather than a price boost. So, poor performance may be associated with more disclosures. The 
above discussion indicates that managers’ disclosure decisions are affected by firm performance, 
but the directional relationship is unclear. Accordingly, we hypothesize in the null form: 
 H1: Firm performance is unrelated to managers’ decision to stop quarterly earnings 
guidance.  
The relation between guidance cessation and changes in long-term investments 
The claims for stopping quarterly guidance, outlined in our Introduction, are based on the 
argument that such guidance caters to short-term investors and in turn induces managers to 
under-invest in long-term growth to meet quarterly earnings targets. Accordingly, once firms 
stop quarterly guidance, managers, unshackled by the myopic earnings game, are expected to 
increase long-term investments in R&D and capital expenditures. However, whether capital 
markets are dominated by myopic investors has never been conclusively established. In fact, 
recent evidence indicates that investors react to revisions in analysts’ long-term forecasts much 
more strongly than to near-term forecasts, thereby rejecting investors’ myopia (Copeland et al. 
2004). Thus, we hypothesize in the null form: 
H2: The decision to stop guidance is unrelated to changes in long-term investments 
after guidance cessation.  
 
                                                 
6 It is unclear from his study whether the decrease of forecasts in the lackluster years is due to a decrease in annual 
or in quarterly forecasts. Our study focuses on quarterly guidance (forecasts).  
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The change in alternative voluntary disclosures after ceasing guidance  
Even if earnings guidance has an undesired effect on the firm’s investing decisions, such 
guidance likely enriches the firm’s information environment and reduces information 
asymmetry. Eliminating guidance will therefore adversely affect the information environment, 
unless the company enhances alternative disclosures. Guidance stoppers and their supporters 
frequently claim that after ceasing guidance they would provide additional forward-looking 
disclosures about key drivers of earnings and long-term strategies. We accordingly examine 
whether firms increase other forward-looking disclosures after guidance cessation. Our 
hypothesis, stated in the null form, is: 
H3: After stopping guidance, managers do not change the level of other forward-
looking disclosures.   
Changes in the quantity and quality of analysts’ information after guidance cessation  
 Financial analysts are important intermediaries between firms and investors. Analysts 
provide earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and analysis of the firm’s future prospects, 
which are obviously useful to investors, as evidenced by the reaction to revisions of forecasts and 
recommendations. In addition to providing information to investors, analysts also provide 
benefits to the firms they cover by making them better known to investors and likely reducing 
these firms’ cost of capital.7 It is, therefore, not surprising that 95% of the respondents to the 
NIRI (2006) survey believe that one of the benefits of providing guidance is to improve the 
communication between the firm and its analysts/investors. 
                                                 
7 High analyst following reduces information asymmetry, which in turn reduces the cost of capital. For example, 
Easley and O’Hara (p. 1573) demonstrate that the risk premium in asset pricing can be reduced if the precision of 
information available to investors is improved in which, they argue, analysts play a key role. On the other hand, 
Hughes et al. (2007) and Lambert et al. (2007) demonstrate that the negative association between idiosyncratic 
information and cost of capital is only present in some situations.  
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The effect of guidance cessation on analysts’ activities is difficult to predict. To the extent 
that analysts rely on public information, the quality of their product could be adversely affected 
by a firm’s decision to cease guidance. As a result, analysts may lose interest in following the 
firm, and those that continue coverage may have greater difficulty in forecasting its earnings and 
thereby generate more biased earnings estimates. If, on the other hand, analysts mainly play a 
role of private information generators, guidance cessation is expected to increase analysts’ 
interest in a firm, and the quality of analysts’ forecasts will not decline, even though their 
opinions may become more divergent as a result of their use of different sources of private 
information. Our hypothesis, stated in the null form, is:  
H4: After firms stop guidance, there will be no changes in the quantity and quality of 
analysts’ activities.  In particular, there will be:  
• H4a: no change in analyst coverage (proxy for the volume of analyst activities). 
• H4b: no change in the dispersion of analyst estimates. 
• H4c: no change in the accuracy of analyst estimates.   
The sample selection is described in the next section. Then, for each hypothesis, we 
introduce in separate sections the empirical models, explain the variables used, and report the test 
results. Robustness tests are briefly discussed in the text or footnotes.  
3. Sample selection 
We use a de facto approach to identify the firms that maintained and those that stopped 
providing quarterly earnings guidance, summarized in Table 1. We refer to each quarter during 
our sample period—2002Q1–2005Q1—as an “event quarter” and to the preceding four quarters 
as the “pre-event” period.  The event quarter and the subsequent three quarters are labeled as the 
“post-event” period (See the timeline below.). We identify “guidance stoppers” as the firms that 
issued guidance for at least three out of the four pre-event quarters, but gave no guidance for any 
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of the four post-event quarters. Firms that provided guidance for at least three out of the four 
quarters in both the pre- and post-event periods are termed “guidance maintainers.” We start with 
the First Call Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) database to identify guidance stoppers and 
maintainers and obtain an initial sample of 353 stoppers and 699 maintainers.8,  9 
Timeline 
Identifying Guidance Stoppers and Maintainers  
 
    Sample Period  
     2002Q1-2005Q1 
 
 
  
Qt-4 Qt-3 Qt-2 Qt-1 Qt 
Event Quarter  
Qt+1 Qt+2 Qt+3 
Post-Event PeriodPre-Event Period 
 
Since the CIG database is incomplete (Anilowski et al. 2007), we search the Factiva news 
database to make sure that the initially identified stoppers indeed have stopped quarterly 
guidance.10 We find that 94 of the CIG-identified stoppers actually provided either earnings 
(including GAAP or pro forma earnings in dollars or EPS and earnings growth) or revenue 
guidance for at least one of the four post-event quarters. We exclude these firms from the stopper 
sample. We also exclude 13 firms whose first “silent” quarter, according to the news search, is 
                                                 
8 Throughout the study we exclude guidance issued after the fiscal quarter end because these preannouncements are 
released so close to the earnings announcement date that they are a part of a firm’s earnings announcement strategy 
rather than a guidance strategy. 
9 We find 527 firm-quarters that satisfy the data requirement for guidance stoppers. For a firm that appears in this 
group in more than one quarter, we choose its earliest quarter (See Note b in Table 1). For guidance maintainers we 
find 5,015 firm-quarters fulfilling our data requirements. If a maintainer satisfies this requirement in more than one 
quarter, we randomly choose a quarter from the qualified quarters as this firm’s event quarter. Thus, there are no 
repeat firms in our samples. 
10 We in fact search for the earnings or revenue guidance history of all the stoppers from a year before the event 
quarter to October 2006. First, we search by the key word “guidance” in the headline and leading paragraph of 
Business Wire, PR Newswire, Associated Press Newswires, and Reuters Significant Developments. We find that 
guidance is most often given on the date of the previous-quarter earnings announcement and that Reuters Significant 
Developments reports most of the guidance. We additionally search by the key words “sees,” “expects,” or 
“expectation” in the headline and leading paragraph and find only a few items of news. For firms with no guidance 
news in the post-event period, we further search by key words “guidance,” “outlook,” “expect,” or “forecast” in the 
quarterly earnings announcement press releases for the post-event period. 
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after the end of our sample period. Furthermore, our research design may lead to the inclusion of 
firms that appear to have stopped guidance because they were acquired or went bankrupt. Using 
the first digit of DLSTCD in CRSP, we identify and exclude 24 firms that were acquired (no firm 
went bankrupt) during the six quarters beginning with the event quarter. Consequently, our final 
stopper sample has 222 unique firms. Similarly, we exclude from the guidance maintainers 23 
firms that were subsequently acquired, leaving us with a final control sample of 676 maintainers.  
It should be noted that most of our quarterly guidance stoppers did not stop providing annual 
earnings/revenue guidance.11 Our interest is in examining the issue of stopping quarterly 
guidance, because the debate about guidance on Wall Street and Main Street has focused on 
quarterly guidance. For example, the McKinsey article, the CFA Institute white paper, and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Commission all recommended that companies eliminate quarterly 
earnings guidance, believing that such guidance, but apparently not annual guidance, induces 
short-termism (Hsieh et al. 2006; CFA 2006; U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2007). Interestingly, 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce specifically calls for companies to switch from quarterly to 
annual guidance. In the empirical tests below we find that the reported results do not differ for 
those that stop only quarterly guidance than for those that stop both quarterly and annual 
guidance. Henceforth, we refer to “quarterly earnings guidance” as “guidance.”   
Panel A of Table 2 presents the distribution of guidance stoppers and maintainers across the 
four fiscal quarters of our sample period. To avoid skewing the data in Panel A, we report the 
numbers for the three complete calendar years (2002-2004), excluding 34 stoppers and 99 
maintainers whose event quarter is the first quarter of 2005. Note that guidance is 
disproportionately stopped during the first fiscal quarter: More than 45 percent of the stoppers 
ceased guidance in the first fiscal quarter, suggesting that the decision to stop quarterly guidance 
                                                 
11 Of the 222 quarterly guidance stoppers, 31 firms also discontinued their annual guidance. 
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is often made when a firm reviews its annual performance after the end of the fiscal year. In 
contrast, the maintainers are more evenly distributed across the four fiscal quarters.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the distribution of firms across the 13-quarter sample period, 
indicating a relatively high frequency of stoppers in the first two quarters of 2003, likely due to 
the ripple effects of Coca-Cola’s widely publicized guidance cessation announcement on 
December 13, 2002. The number of guidance maintainers during the sample period steadily 
increases, consistent with the overall upward trend in quarterly guidance (untabulated). Panel C 
of Table 2 reports the industry composition of guidance stoppers and maintainers: Software 
companies (business services) and electrical equipment manufacturers are prominent among both 
the stoppers and maintainers, as are chemical products and measurement equipment 
manufacturers. There is no significant industry distinction between the stoppers and maintainers. 
We now move to examine the first hypothesis. 
4. Firm performance and quarterly guidance cessation 
Most guidance stoppers do not announce or explain the change in disclosure policy. Among 
those that do, “poor performance” is, as expected, rarely mentioned. We nevertheless suspect, 
and extant research suggests, that prior performance is a major motive for stopping guidance. We 
use a logit model to test this hypothesis, controlling for several reasons that managers cite when 
they do announce the policy change and for other factors.  
Variable identifications and measurements 
Change in performance 
We use three main measures and two supplementary ones for change in performance. The 
main measures are: the change in earnings (∆EPS), a variable for meeting or beating analyst 
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estimates (MBanalyst), and the ex post change in future earnings (FutureEPS). Specifically, 
∆EPS is the average change in diluted earnings per share (EPS) in the four pre-event quarters 
relative to their respective same-quarter-last-year values, deflated by the stock price at the 
beginning of the pre-event period.12 MBanalyst is the proportion of quarters in the pre-event 
period for which the firm meets or beats the most recent analyst consensus compiled before the 
earnings announcement.13 FutureEPS is the average change in diluted EPS from the four pre-
event quarters to the four post-event quarters, similarly deflated as ∆EPS. Strictly speaking, this 
measure assumes that managers can perfectly predict next year’s performance, which is, of 
course, a strong assumption. But even if managers can only partially predict near-term 
earnings—a reasonable assumption—FutureEPS will proxy for anticipated performance.   
 We add to the above measures a variable indicating accounting losses (Loss) and one for 
stock performance (Return). DeGeorge et al. (1999) argue that zero profit is a common earnings 
benchmark which firms strive to surpass. We accordingly define Loss as the proportion of loss-
reporting quarters (negative diluted EPS) in the pre-event period. We include stock performance 
in the analysis, expecting it to reflect the firm’s performance incremental to earnings. This 
variable, Return, is the buy-and-hold return (compounded monthly) during the one-year period 
before the earnings announcement for the quarter preceding guidance stoppage, less the buy-and-
hold return on the equal-weighted market index in the same period.  
                                                 
12 We use the stock price at the beginning of the pre-event period because prices are expected to decrease for 
guidance stoppers if poor performance is a major reason for firms to stop providing guidance. Throughout the paper, 
we split-adjust earnings (both realized and forecasted) and prices when price is used as the deflator. To avoid the 
influence of outliers due to small deflators, we exclude the observations with a deflator less than 1.   
13 For two reasons we also examine the proportion of quarters in the pre-event period in which a firm meets or 
exceeds its own most recent earnings estimate issued before the fiscal quarter end. First, a firm’s inability to meet its 
own forecast may impair its credibility, leading analysts to rely less on the firm’s future guidance (Williams 1996) 
thereby decreasing analysts’ demand for guidance. Second, Feng and Koch (2006) find that a firm’s poor predicting 
ability is an important reason for omitting guidance for a quarter. We find that this variable has no explanatory 
power (untabulated, coefficient= –0.358, z-statistic= –1.43).   
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We control for four frequently stated reasons for guidance cessation. A survey by the 
National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI 2006) asked members who were contemplating 
discontinuing guidance to list the reasons. The top three reasons are a change in management 
philosophy (i.e., quarterly guidance induces short-termism.) (47%); industry trend (27%); and 
low earnings visibility (25%), which is, presumably, difficulty in predicting earnings. Appendix 
A lists the 26 firms (11.7%) in our 222 stopper sample that publicly announced their policy 
change. Among these 26 stopper-announcers, 10 (38.5%) implied a refocus on the long term, two 
firms (7.7%) indicated they were following the market or industry trend, and 12 (46.2%) 
mentioned the difficulty of predicting earnings.14 We examine these motives as follows:  
Disclosure philosophy change 
A change in management philosophy regarding guidance most likely occurs with a change in 
the top management team, and therefore we expect a higher likelihood of guidance cessation 
after a management change. We assign 1 to the dummy variable Management if a firm has 
changed or announced a change of the CEO or CFO positions during the six months before the 
end of the event quarter and 0 otherwise. Information about management change is obtained by 
news search in Reuters News and the four newswires mentioned in Footnote 10. We predict 
Management to have a positive coefficient.  
Industry trend 
Previous studies (Dye and Sridhar 1995; Gul and Lundholm 1995) suggest that a firm’s 
disclosure decision is influenced by the actions taken by its peers; that is, firms tend to herd. To 
quantify this factor, we define for each sample firm IndNo, which is the proportion of companies 
                                                 
14 One firm (3.8%) said it would replace quarterly guidance with monthly sales reports; 5 firms (19.2%) gave no 
reason. Note in Appendix A that four companies each gave two reasons.  
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in the firm’s 2-digit SIC code that do not provide any quarterly guidance in the pre-event period. 
We expect that firms with high levels of IndNo (i.e., absence of guidance is popular) are more 
likely to cease guidance, and thus expect the coefficient on IndNo to be positive.  
Past or anticipated difficulty in forecasting earnings 
Managers with less precise private information are more likely to withhold it (Verrecchia 
1990). To capture past difficulty in forecasting earnings, we use the variable Dispersion, 
measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS—reflecting forecasting 
uncertainty—in the most recent consensus before the earnings announcement, averaged over the 
pre-event period. To scale for the cross-sectional differences in EPS, we deflate forecast 
dispersion by the stock price at the beginning of the pre-event period. We predict a positive 
coefficient for forecast dispersion because higher dispersion suggests greater difficulty in 
predicting earnings and therefore a higher likelihood of guidance cessation.  
To capture managers’ increased anticipated difficulty in forecasting future earnings, we use 
FutureVAR. The variable measures the extent to which future earnings increasingly deviate from 
past earnings. It is computed as the change from the four pre-event quarters to the four post-
event quarters in the sum of the absolute differences between quarterly EPS and the EPS in the 
same quarter of the year before the pre-event period.15 We deflate this measure by the stock price 
at the beginning of the pre-event period.  
 
                                                 
15 To clarify: define the post-event quarters as t, t+1, t+2, and t+3 and the pre-event quarters as t-4, t-3, t-2, and t-1.  
The year before the pre-event period quarters are t-8, t-7, t-6, and t-5. The variable FuturVAR is the difference 
between A and B, where A = mean (│Xt-Xt-8│, │Xt+1-Xt-7│, Xt+2-Xt-6│, │Xt+3-Xt-5│) and B = mean (│Xt-4-Xt-8│, 
│Xt-3-Xt-7│, │Xt-2-Xt-6│, │Xt-1-Xt-5│). Thus, we use the year before the pre-event as the benchmark. Variable A 
measures the deviations of earnings (X) in the post-event quarters from the benchmark quarters and B measures the 
deviation of earnings in the pre-event quarters from the benchmark quarters. 
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Other guidance cessation motives 
Finally, we control for four variables that capture important firm characteristics associated 
with disclosure: litigation risk, firm size, analyst coverage, and stock price volatility. In addition, 
we control for fixed time effects by including the quarterly dummy variables. Firms with a 
greater risk of being sued by shareholders may be inclined to provide guidance, especially 
warnings, to mitigate litigation risk and its cost (Skinner 1994, 1997; Field et al. 2005). On the 
other hand, Rogers and Van Buskirk (2006) suggest that firms that are concerned with lawsuits 
may limit their voluntary disclosures. Thus, we do not predict the effect of litigation risk on 
firms’ guidance cessation. Litigation is the estimated probability of being sued by shareholders, 
using the litigation exposure model in Appendix B with the input variables measured in the one-
year period before the event quarter.  
We control for firm size, but do not predict its effect on guidance cessation.16 Firm size is 
measured by LogMVE, the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the 
event quarter. In addition, we control for analyst coverage, but do not predict its coefficient 
because its effect on guidance cessation depends on analysts’ role in the capital markets (see 
discussion in Section 2). The variable Analyst is the average number of analysts whose forecasts 
are included in the most recent consensus before the earnings announcement for the four pre-
event quarters. If a firm-quarter is covered by Compustat but not by I/B/E/S, we assume analyst 
following is 0 for that firm quarter. 
We control for stock volatility because managers tend to believe that voluntary disclosure 
reduces stock volatility (Hsieh et al. 2006) and will therefore be reluctant to stop guidance if 
their stock volatility is high. The variable Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock 
                                                 
16 A large firm faces a greater demand for voluntary disclosure from market intermediaries covering the firm and 
from the large number of shareholders. On the other hand, large firms may be more likely to lead off a new industry 
path of stopping quarterly guidance. 
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returns in the one-year period ending five days after the earnings announcement for the quarter 
preceding the event quarter. We subtract from this measure the standard deviation of the equal-
weighted market index in the same period.  
Equation (1) is our logit model, where the dependent variable Stop is 1 for a guidance stopper 
and 0 for a maintainer, and F(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, 
including the variables defined above.   
Pr (Stop =1) = F(a0 + a1∆EPS + a2 MBanalyst + a3 FutureEPS + a4 Loss + a5 Return 
                            + a6 Management + a7 IndNo + a8 Dispersion + a9 FutureVAR + a10 Litigation 
                      + a11 LogMVE + a12 Analyst + a13 Volatility + quarterly dummies + ε)        (1) 
Test Results 
 
The univariate statistics of the variables by stoppers vs. maintainers are presented in Table 3. 
The Wilcoxon tests show that relative to the maintainers, guidance stoppers have decreased 
earnings (Z = –3.33 for ∆EPS), more consensus misses (Z = –7.14 for MBanalyst), more loss 
quarters (Z = 4.08 for Loss), and lower stock returns (Z = –5.59 for Return) in the pre-event 
period and that they probably anticipate a decline in future earnings (Z = –3.13 for FutureEPS). 
These comparisons indicate that the stoppers are troubled firms.  
Table 4 reports the logit model estimations with the coefficients on the quarterly dummies 
suppressed. The estimations use 208 stoppers and 640 maintainers that have complete data. We 
estimate the model in two ways due to the high correlation between FutureVAR and FuturEPS 
and primarily discuss the estimation that includes FutureEPS and excludes FutureVAR.17 
Almost all the firm performance variables we examine are statistically significant. The 
likelihood of stopping quarterly guidance is significantly higher for firms with a larger 
                                                 
17 The correlation between FutureEPS and FutureVAR is –0.933. When both FutureEPS and FutureVAR are 
included in the model, they lose statistical significance as a result of multicollinearity. 
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seasonally adjusted earnings decline before stoppage (coefficient on ∆EPS = –9.739, z-statistic = 
–2.65). Even after accounting for the earnings decline, we find that a firm is more likely to stop 
guidance when it has a poor record of meeting/beating analyst consensus (coefficient on 
MBanalyst = –1.751, z-statistic = –4.15), and when it anticipates poor earnings in future quarters 
(coefficient on FutureEPS = –5.237, z-statistic = –2.14). The likelihood of stopping quarterly 
guidance is weakly higher if a firm experiences a higher frequency of losses in the pre-event 
period (coefficient on Loss =0.659, z-statistic = 1.70). Finally, Return is significantly lower for 
the stoppers than for the maintainers (coefficient = –0.562, z-statistic = –2.29). These results 
convey a consistent message: poor performance—both realized and anticipated—contributes to 
firms’ decision to stop quarterly guidance.  
To gain insight into the relation between performance and guidance cessation, we present in 
Table 5 quarter-by-quarter the three common earnings performance benchmarks surrounding the 
event quarter: (1) reporting losses, (2) experiencing an earnings decrease from the same quarter 
in the prior year, and (3) meeting or beating the most recent analyst consensus compiled before 
the earnings announcement. Relative to the maintainers, guidance stoppers in each pre-stoppage 
quarter have higher frequencies of losses and earnings declines and a lower frequency of meeting 
or beating consensus forecasts. Importantly, as the stoppers approach the guidance stopping 
quarter, they increasingly suffer from losses, earnings declines, and a failure to meet or beat 
analyst consensus. The maintainers do not have such patterns.   
The logit results regarding managers’ stated reasons for guidance cessation are as follows: 
Consistent with our expectations, firms are more likely to cease guidance if they have recently 
undergone or announced a change in senior management (coefficient = 0.974, z-statistic = 3.73). 
The coefficient on IndNo is significantly positive (coefficient of Management = 1.270, z-statistic 
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= 2.14), indicating that a firm is more likely to stop guidance if a larger proportion of its industry 
peers do not provide guidance. Dispersion has a positive coefficient of 313.4 (z-statistic = 4.45), 
and in Estimation (2) FutureVAR is significantly positively associated with the likelihood of 
guidance cessation (coefficient = 6.895, z-statistic = 2.39). The results about Dispersion and 
FutureVAR suggest that both past and anticipated difficulties in forecasting earnings contribute 
to guidance cessation. Our findings therefore confirm the common reasons cited by managers 
announcing the guidance policy change.  
The associations between guidance cessation and other firm characteristics are as follows: 
Firms with a higher litigation risk are more likely to cease guidance, suggesting that such firms 
curtail forward-looking disclosure to reduce risk exposure. Firms with a higher analyst following 
are less likely to stop guidance, and firm size is not associated with guidance cessation. After 
controlling for firm performance and other characteristics, we find that guidance stoppers have 
lower stock volatility than maintainers before guidance cessation.  
To announce or not to announce guidance cessation 
 
A major difference between our study and Chen et al. (2006) is that they focus on stoppers 
that have publicly announced the policy change, while we examine all stoppers. To examine the 
potential selection bias induced by the public announcement, that is, the possibility that firms 
choosing to make such an announcement may differ from those stopping guidance “quietly,” we 
examine the announcer-stoppers in our sample. From our 26 announcer-stoppers we exclude six 
firms that announced unusually early or late (to avoid misclassifications of pre- and post-event 
periods in the test). In Table 6 we report the logit estimation that examines the differences 
between the announcers and non-announcers.18 Because of the small sample size, we mark the 
                                                 
18 To improve test power, we do not include the variables found to be statistically insignificant in Table 4.  
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statistical significance in a one-tailed test. The results suggest the following: (1) the announcers 
have better earnings performance but poorer stock performance than the non-announcers, (2) the 
announcers are more likely to have a change in the top management, (3) providing quarterly 
earnings guidance is more frequent in the announcers’ industries than in the non-announcers,’ 
and (4) the announcers have lower earnings uncertainty than the non-announcers. Thus, despite 
the small announcer sample size, it appears that there are systematic differences between the 
announcers and the non-announcers and likely a selection bias in focusing on a sample limited to 
announcers. In all subsequent tests we perform robustness checks to examine whether the 
findings for the complete stopper sample also hold for the announcer-stopper subsample.  
5. Post-cessation changes in long-term investments  
Empirical model 
Hypothesis 2 relates quarterly guidance to firms’ investments in long-term growth, a focal 
point of guidance critics. We examine the combined long-term investments in capital 
expenditures and R&D, referred to as CAPEX. Ideally, a firm’s actual level of CAPEX should be 
compared with optimal CAPEX which is unobservable. We proxy for optimal CAPEX in two 
ways. First, we subtract the “normal” industry (2-digit SIC code) level of CAPEX from the 
firm’s CAPEX. This is done by first computing the ratio of the industry sum of CAPEX over the 
sum of the beginning-of-quarter total assets of the firms in the industry. This industry CAPEX 
intensity is then multiplied by the individual firm’s beginning-of-quarter total assets, yielding the 
firm’s normal CAPEX level. This normal CAPEX level is subtracted from the firm’s actual 
quarterly CAPEX to yield the abnormal CAPEX (deviation from optimal), which is then deflated 
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by the beginning-of-quarter total assets to yield a CAPEX-intensity measure.19 The dependent 
variable in our test of H2 is the change in average abnormal CAPEX intensity from the pre-event 
period to the post-event period (ChgCAP). Because changes in firms’ investment decisions may 
take time to implement, we redefine the post-event period to be the event quarter plus the 
subsequent seven quarters (i.e., two years post stoppage).  
Second, we control for firm characteristics that likely explain cross-sectional variations in 
optimal CAPEX, such as earnings performance (ChgROA), growth opportunities (M/B), 
operating cash flows (OCF), leverage (Leverage), and firm size (LogMVE). Specifically, the 
change in a firm’s profitability from the pre- to post-event period affects its investment because 
the change in profitability changes the perceived investment opportunities and the capital 
constraints. Higher profitability, for example, indicates the need to increase production capacity 
as well as to provide funds to finance investment (loosening financial constraints). The change in 
profitability, ChgROA, is measured as the change in the average return on assets from the pre- to 
post-event period.20  
Firms with bright growth opportunities are expected to increase investment (Chung et al. 
1998; Brailsford and Yeoh 2004). We therefore control for growth by the market-to-book ratio, 
M/B, which “contains an ex ante estimate of growth prospects” (Brailsford and Yeoh 2004, 
p.233). M/B is measured at the end of the pre-event period.   
We control for the average operating cash flows, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter total 
assets, in the pre-event period, OCF, because the higher the OCF, the lower the capital 
constraints on investment a firm faces. We allow M/B and OCF to interact because firms are 
                                                 
19 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
20 Here we use ROA instead of price-deflated earnings per share as in other sections because the former ensures that 
the major variables in Equation (2) use the same deflator— total assets.  
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expected to further increase investment when they have both high growth opportunities and 
ample internal capital.  
We control for leverage, measured at the end of the pre-event period as the ratio of total debts 
over the beginning-of-quarter total assets. Highly levered firms, with increased risk of 
bankruptcy, will curtail investment in risky projects (Jensen 1986). In addition, we control for 
firm size in case it explains cross-sectional differences in investment. Finally, we add the pre-
event level of CAPEX intensity (CAP) to the model to control for a potential non-linear relation 
between the change in investment and the initial investment level. Intuitively, it is less likely for 
a firm with a high investment level to substantially enhance investment than for a firm with a 
low investment level to do so.21 Finally, we allow for within-industry correlations of the error 
term in the estimation to address unspecified industry factors.  
Equation (2) is our empirical model for examining investment change post guidance 
cessation.  
ChgCAP = b0 + b1 Stop + b2 ChgROA + b3 M/B + b4 OCF + b5 M/B*OCF + b6 Leverage 
                             + b7 LogMVE + b8 CAP + ε                                                                          (2) 
 
Our investment variable, CAPEX, includes capital expenditures and R&D. Investment 
preferences for these two types of investment may differ, and accordingly we also examine the 
change in R&D only from the pre- to post-event period after guidance cessation. R&D 
expenditures reduce reported earnings dollar for dollar, thereby focusing directly on the 
managerial myopia effect allegedly induced by quarterly guidance. The model for R&D is 
Equation (3): 
ChgR&D = c0 + c1 Stop + c2 ChgROA + c3 M/B + c4 OCF + c5 M/B*OCF + c6 Leverage 
                              + c7 LogMVE + c8 R&D + ε                                                                         (3) 
                                                 
21 If the initial level is in fact irrelevant, the coefficients of other variables are estimated without bias but with less 
precision. We find in both this and subsequent tests that the initial level variable significantly increases the model fit 
(except for the ChgAnalyst test). Our findings are all robust to excluding the initial level variable.    
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Test results 
Table 7 reports the estimations of Models (2) and (3) after the exclusion of outliers (i.e., 
studentized residual above two in absolute value, see Belsley, Huh, and Welsch (1980)). For 
Model (2) we exclude the firms that do not have any CAPEX (capital expenditures and R&D) in 
either the pre- or post-event period. In the test of CAPEX, the coefficient on Stop (guidance) is 
statistically insignificant (coefficient = –0.0011, t = –0.90), indicating that guidance stoppers do 
not increase their total long-term investments after guidance cessation. Most of coefficient 
estimates on the control variables are as expected. Firms increase investment when their earnings 
improve (ChgROA) and when they have better opportunities to grow (M/B), especially with 
ample internal capital on hand (M/B*OCF). In contrast, firms decrease investment when they are 
highly levered (Leverage). These results are unchanged if we estimate the model using the robust 
regression method, which is robust to outliers (identified differently) and a possible violation of 
normality (unreported).22 The coefficient on Stop is also insignificant if we subtract the industry 
median level of period-specific CAPEX in constructing ChgCAP.   
For Model (3), we exclude the firms that do not report any R&D activities in either the pre- 
or post-event period. Consequently, 44.3% of the stoppers and 55.0% of the maintainers in 
Model (2) are available for Model (3). The R&D test (right two columns in Table 7) shows that 
guidance stoppers with R&D activities do increase R&D spending after stopping guidance 
(coefficient = 0.0014, t = 3.13).23 The negative coefficient on OCF suggests that firms with high 
operating cash flows do not increase R&D as much as firms with low operating cash flows. 
                                                 
22 Using robust regression, we find ChgROA and M/B * OCF lose statistical significance. See Note 1 in Table 9 for 
the robust estimation method. We report the Belsley et al. outlier treatment method because it allows for within-
industry error correlations, the control of which is important for this test, while the robust estimation does not.  
23 When we add a dummy for the announcer-stoppers, we find that these firms do not increase R&D after stoppage. 
The sum of coefficients on Stop and this announcer dummy is –0.0005 with an F statistic of 0.18. We find no 
difference between the announcer-stoppers and non-announcer stoppers in the CAPEX test.  
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Perhaps firms with high cash flows are in the mature stage (“cash cows”) and therefore do not 
increase R&D spending. When we estimate Model (3) with “robust regression,” as explained 
earlier for CAPEX, the coefficient of Stop is insignificant (coefficient = 0.0007; t = 1.02, 
unreported). The statistical significance also disappears if we subtract the industry median level 
of period-specific R&D in constructing ChgR&D. Thus, our result regarding the post-cessation 
effect on R&D is very tentative. 
In sum, we find no evidence that firms increase total long-term investments in CAPEX after 
guidance cessation, inconsistent with the myopia-inducing argument for quarterly guidance. We 
do, however, find tentative evidence for a subset of firms that engage in R&D, suggesting that 
those expenditures increased after guidance cessation.    
6. Change in alternative disclosures subsequent to guidance cessation 
Hypothesis 3 deals with the post-guidance cessation change in corporate disclosures. To 
examine whether guidance stoppers increase voluntary disclosure of other forward-looking 
information, we randomly choose 100 stoppers from the stopper sample, and for each we 
randomly choose a fiscal quarter in the post-event period, which we refer to as the “post-
quarter.” To examine the change in disclosures, we select for each stopper the same fiscal quarter 
in the pre-event period, which we refer to as the “pre-quarter.”24 
We collect forward-looking disclosures from four sources: the earnings announcement press 
release, the MD&A section of 10-Q, the earnings announcement conference call transcript (the 
presentation portion), and special press releases (that appeared in the four major newswires) 
between the prior-quarter earnings announcement date and the fiscal quarter end.25 Our 
                                                 
24 The substantial effort involved in hand collecting and especially coding the disclosures (details below) restricted 
this test to a subsample of 100 stoppers.   
25 They are PR Newswire, Business Wire, Associated Press Wires, and Reuters News. 
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disclosure data is, accordingly, quite comprehensive. We drop three firms that do not have 
earnings announcement press releases for both the pre-quarter and post-quarter. Among the 
remaining 97 firms, 18 firms do not have MD&A’s because the10-Qs were not filed for the 
fourth fiscal quarter, and for another firm the 10-Q was not found. For 24 firms the conference 
call transcripts were not found for both the pre-quarter and post-quarter. We find special press 
releases with earnings-related, forward- looking disclosures for 28 firm-quarters and additional 
press releases with information about restructuring and acquisition plans. The forward-looking 
disclosures (excluding earnings and sales guidance) are coded into eight categories, detailed in 
Appendix C.  
We aggregate the codes of forward-looking disclosures from four sources in two ways.  
Under the first approach we sum for each firm the number of disclosures. Under the second 
approach, for each of the eight disclosure categories we take the maximum number of 
disclosures a firm releases in one source. For example, suppose a given firm has four Category B 
(estimates of key drivers of earnings) disclosures in the earnings announcement press release, 
two Category B disclosures in the MD&A, and none in the conference call and special press 
releases. The total number of Category B disclosures for this firm is six under the first approach, 
assuming that the two disclosures in the MD&A are incremental to the four items in the earnings 
release. Under the second approach we have four disclosures (the maximum number from one 
source), assuming that the two disclosures in the MD&A do not add information to the four 
disclosures in the earnings release. Our test conclusions are the same from both approaches and 
the results are also robust to excluding firms that do not have conference calls for both quarters. 
For brevity, we report the analysis using the first approach below.    
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Panels A and B of Table 8 report the distribution of the total number of disclosures per firm 
by disclosure category in the pre-quarter and post-quarter, respectively. For example, the first 
row of Panel A indicates that in the pre-quarter, 22 firms gave no information about operational 
changes, 30 firms gave one disclosure of this type, and 19 firms gave two disclosures. Panel C 
summarizes the number of stoppers that increased, maintained, or decreased forward-looking 
disclosure after guidance cessation: 46 firms decreased, 21 had no change, and 30 enhanced 
disclosure. In the decreased disclosure group, the mean (median) decrease is –3.63 (–3), and in 
the increased disclosure group the mean (median) increase is 2.57 (2). On a whole, the t-test 
shows that, on average, stoppers decreased forward-looking disclosure after guidance cessation (t 
= –2.64).26 This conclusion is confirmed by the signed rank test (p = 0.009).   
In Panel D we report the stoppers’ practice of offering annual earnings/sales guidance. For 
each pre- and post-event period (four quarters each) we count a firm in the “YES” group if the 
First Call CIG database has a record of annual guidance for that period or if we observe an 
annual earnings/sales forecast in the hand collected data. We find that 69 firms (71.1%) gave 
annual guidance in both periods, 12 firms (12.4%) stopped issuing annual guidance along with 
the quarterly guidance, and three firms (3.1%) replaced their quarterly guidance with an annual 
guidance. Thus, we find that along with the quarterly guidance cessation, annual earnings/sales 
guidance is also largely curtailed. Recall the Chamber of Commerce’s recommendation to 
substitute annual for quarterly guidance. 
Taken together, our examination does not support the claim that guidance stoppers replace 
the guidance with alternative, forward-looking information—a sobering finding indeed.27  
                                                 
26 A caveat: we examine the quantity of disclosures, assuming similar quality of each disclosure across firms.  
27 We observe a few exceptions. For example, after stopping quarterly guidance, Hillenbrand Industries issued a 
more detailed outlook table for the fiscal year; Kinder Morgan provided guidance on how three out of its five 
segments were performing towards their respective annual budget targets.  
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7. Changes in the quantity and quality of analysts’ activities post-guidance cessation 
We examine here Hypothesis 4—post-stopping changes in analyst coverage and the 
attributes of their forecasts.   
Changes in analyst coverage 
In Model (4) below, we compare the average number of analysts following a company during 
the pre-event period with that in the post-event period to examine the change in analyst coverage. 
The dependent variable is ChgAnalyst. Our main control variables in this model reflect firm 
performance, because Chung and Jo (1996, p.496) report that “more analysts follow high quality 
firms than low quality firms because brokers find it easier to market stocks of high quality 
firms.” Similarly, McNichols and O’Brien (1997) report that analysts initiate coverage of firms 
that have good prospects and drop those with lackluster performance to avoid jeopardizing their 
investment banking business after issuing unfavorable recommendations. Accordingly, we 
include two performance measures in the model, both defined earlier in Section 4: Return, which 
controls for past stock performance, and FutureEPS, which reflects the change in earnings 
performance from the pre- to post-event period.28 Additionally, we control for the level of 
analyst coverage in the pre-event period, capturing a potential nonlinear relation between the 
change in analyst coverage and initial coverage. We also control for firm size. These variables 
are included in Model (4): 
ChgAnalyst = d0 + d1Stop + d2Return + d3FutureEPS + d4 LogMVE + d5 Analyst + ε         (4) 
 
The left column of Table 9 presents the robust-regression estimates of Model (4).29 The 
coefficient on Stop (guidance)—the focus of our analysis—is significantly negative (coefficient 
= –0.577, t-statistic = –3.95), indicating that stopping quarterly guidance is associated with a 
                                                 
28 Other performance measures used in Model (1) do not have explanatory power in Model (4) (unreported).  
29 For Models 4, 5, and 6, the Belsley et al. (1980) outlier treatment method yields similar results for all coefficients. 
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reduction in analyst coverage. Return has a positive coefficient, consistent with the conjecture 
that analysts drop poorly performing firms. In addition, large firms are more likely to increase 
coverage than small ones.  
When we add a dummy variable for the 20 timely announced stoppers, we find that these 
announcer-stoppers have a decrease of 0.184 analysts, which is statistically insignificant (Wald 
test F-statistic = 0.19, unreported), while the non-announcer stoppers, on average, have a 
significant decrease of 0.581 analysts (t statistic = –3.80).30 
Accordingly, we conclude that the announcer-stoppers do not experience a decrease in 
analyst coverage, but the non-announcer stoppers suffer from a significant decrease in analyst 
following after guidance cessation.  
Change in analyst forecast dispersion 
In Model (5) we examine the change in the average forecast dispersion of analysts from the 
pre- to post-event period (ChgDisper). The main controls are the change in average earnings 
from the pre- to post-event period (FutureEPS, defined earlier) and its absolute change 
(|FutureEPS|). We control for the change in earnings because the divergence of analyst opinions 
is likely higher for bad news. We include the absolute change in earnings as a control for a 
change in earnings variability because volatile earnings are more difficult to predict. As in Model 
(4), we control for the pre-event level of forecast dispersion and firm size in Model (5):  
ChgDisper = e0 + e1Stop + e2FutureEPS + e3|FutureEPS| + e4LogMVE + e5Dispersion + ε (5) 
 
The middle column of Table 9 presents the estimation of Model (5). The dummy variable 
Stop is significantly positive (coefficient = 0.0002, t = 6.55), indicating increased forecast 
                                                 
30 We do not find differences between the two subgroups of guidance stoppers in other tests regarding analysts.  
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dispersion after firms stop providing guidance. As expected, dispersion is larger for firms with 
more volatile earnings and analyst disagreement is inversely related to firm size.    
The dispersion increase after guidance cessation is likely the result of a poorer information 
environment absent the guidance. Without guidance, analysts rely more on their private 
information, which increases the disagreement among analysts. Guidance cessation increases the 
uncertainty about the firm. Some suggest that divergence of opinion reflects increased risk 
perceived by investors, which in turn suggests that firms with greater analyst disagreement may 
face a higher cost of capital (Williams 1977; Varian 1985; Merton 1987). According to these 
conjectures, increased analyst forecast dispersion should be a serious concern to managers 
contemplating stopping guidance.  
Change in analyst forecast error 
In Model (6) we examine the change in average analyst forecast errors from the pre- to post-
event period (ChgError). Forecast error is defined as the absolute difference between realized 
earnings and the most recent analyst consensus estimate compiled before the quarterly earnings 
announcement (both from I/B/E/S), deflated by stock price. For reasons similar to those given 
above, we control in (6) for FutureEPS, |FutureEPS|, the pre-event level of forecast error 
(Error), and firm size.  
ChgError = f0 + f1 Stop + f2 FutureEPS + f3 |FutureEPS| + f4 LogMVE + f5 Error + ε            (6) 
 
The right column of Table 9 presents the estimation of Model (6). The variable Stop is 
significantly positive (coefficient = 0.0003, t = 3.35), indicating that analyst forecasts are less 
accurate after firms stop guidance. To the extent that investors use analyst forecasts in their 
valuation models, our results suggest that stopping guidance may adversely affect investors’ 
decisions. 
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Summarizing, our evidence rejects hypotheses H4a- H4c, indicating that guidance cessation 
is associated with a deterioration in the information environment as far as analysts’ output is 
concerned.     
8. Postscript 
Tracking guidance stoppers, we observe that of the 222 stoppers, 68 firms—a full 31%—
resumed quarterly guidance (with a median silent period of six quarters) by October 2006. This 
suggests that some stoppers temporarily cease guidance, and resume it when circumstances 
change, whereas the majority stop guidance as a matter of policy.   
In an unreported logit analysis we observe some evidence that the resumers experienced 
fewer loss quarters, more favorable EPS changes, and higher stock volatility during the post-
stoppage period than the non-resumers. This before-resumption earnings performance is 
consistent with our main finding that firms stop quarterly guidance primarily because of poor 
performance. Our finding regarding stock volatility is consistent with the pressure from investors 
to resume guidance. Although the small sample size of resumers does not allow a more thorough 
statistical analysis, we believe that the finding of a large number of resumers attests to the strong 
investor demand for guidance. We would like to note that our reported results are all robust to 
excluding the resumers from the stopper sample.  
9. Conclusions 
Earnings guidance is practiced by a large number of public companies and is clearly 
welcomed by investors and analysts, yet forceful arguments against this practice persist. Perhaps 
in response to these arguments, there has been in recent years a decrease in the number of firms 
providing quarterly guidance. Earnings guidance, though, continues to be a highly controversial 
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practice. Central issues of this controversy can be aired by examining the motives and 
subsequent changes in the real and informational decisions of guidance stoppers, which we do in 
this study.   
We document that a major reason for stopping guidance is poor operating performance, in 
particular, decreased earnings, a spotty record of meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and low 
anticipated earnings. We also find support for several reasons that managers offer to justify 
stopping guidance: a change in management philosophy, low frequency of guidance by industry 
peers, and difficulty in predicting earnings.  
After guidance cessation, we document that stoppers do not increase their total long-term 
investments in capital expenditures and R&D, though we note some tentative evidence of an 
R&D increase for a subsample of firms. Notably, we find that the stoppers’ information 
environment deteriorates after guidance cessation: We do not observe the frequently claimed 
increase in alternative, forward-looking disclosures in lieu of the discontinued guidance. In fact, 
we note that these disclosures are curtailed. And we document that analyst coverage decreases 
and both analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error increase after firms stop guidance.  
Although our study documents associations and not causations, the evidence as a whole is 
consistent with poor operating performance as the major motive for guidance cessation and a 
deterioration in the information environment as its main outcome. All in all, our findings do not 
provide ringing support for the persistent calls to cease quarterly guidance. 
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APPENDIX A 
Guidance Stoppers Who Publicly Announced the Stoppage 
 
No. Company Announce FQE Diff Reasons Given 
1 Leapfrog Enterprises 02/10/04 06/30/04 -141 Difficult to predict 
2 Technitrol  12/12/02 03/31/03 -109 Long-term focus 
3 Payless Shoesource  08/13/03 10/31/03 -79 None 
4 WABTEC Corp. 01/12/04 03/31/04 -79 None 
5 CDW Corp. 04/15/03 06/30/03 -76 Replace with monthly sales
6 McDonald’s Corp. 01/17/03 03/31/03 -73 None 
7 Haemonetics Corp.  04/23/03 06/30/03 -68 Long-term focus 
8 Tweeter Home Entertainment 07/27/04 09/30/04 -65 Difficult to predict 
9 Home Depot 02/25/03 04/30/03 -64 Long-term focus 
10 Consol Energy 01/27/05 03/31/05 -63 Long-term focus 
11 
 
Microstrategy 
 
01/27/05 03/31/05 -63 
 
Difficult to predict 
Long-term Focus 
12 Novell 02/27/03 04/30/03 -62 Difficult to predict 
13 MEDCATH Corp. 02/06/03 03/31/03 -53 Long-term focus 
14 Central Parking 02/14/03 03/31/03 -45 Difficult to predict 
15 Haverty Furtniture 02/14/03 03/31/03 -45 Difficult to predict 
16 Copart 09/17/03 10/31/03 -44 Difficult to predict; Trend 
17 Principal Financial Group 05/24/04 06/30/04 -37 Long-term focus 
18 Guess 02/26/03 03/31/03 -33 None 
19 ASTEC Industries 04/01/03 03/31/03 1 Long-term focus 
20 Calgon Carbon Corp. 02/07/03 12/31/02 38 Long-term focus 
21 Forest Oil Corp. 05/08/03 03/31/03 38 None 
22 
 
Westpoint Systems 
 
02/11/03 12/31/02 42 
 
Difficult to predict 
Long-term Focus 
23 Action Performance 07/28/04 03/31/04 119 Difficult to predict; Trend 
24 Int’l Flavors & Fragrances 01/28/04 09/30/03 120 Difficult to predict 
25 Bob Evans Farms  06/06/05 01/31/05 126 Difficult to predict 
26 Penton Media 08/07/03 03/31/02 494 Difficult to predict 
Notes:  
1.  Among our 222 guidance stoppers, 26 firms publicly announced the stoppage. Announce is the public 
announcement date. FQE is the fiscal quarter end of the first quarter since when the firm does not 
provide quarterly earnings guidance for at least four quarters. Diff is the number of days between 
Announce and FQE. The last column lists the reasons offered by the firm for stopping quarterly 
earnings guidance. We view an announcement as timely (shaded) if it is issued in the fiscal quarter 
that ends with FQE or in the quarter right after that. The number of timely announcements is 20 
(shaded). Note that Firm #26 is a stopper-resumer-stopper.  
2.  Among the 26 announcements, 16 first appeared in firms’ quarterly earnings announcements, seven in 
quarterly conference calls, and three in other news sources.   
3.  The reasons for guidance cessation are summarized as follows: 12 (46.2%) firms cited the difficulty of 
predicting earnings; 10 (38.5%) firms cited or implied a refocus on the long term; two firms (7.7%) 
indicated they were following the market or industry trend; one firm (3.8%) said it would replace 
quarterly guidance with monthly sales reports; 5 firms (19.2%) gave no reason. Note that four 
companies each gave two reasons.  
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APPENDIX B 
Litigation Risk Estimation 
 
The litigation-risk probit model is similar to that used in Tucker (2007), which closely 
follows Rogers and Stocken (2005) and Johnson et al. (2001). The model estimation uses the 
class-action filings during January 1996 and September 2003, downloaded from the Stanford 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website.   
   
Pr(Lawsuit i = 1) = Ф (a0 + a1 LogMVEi + a2 Turnoveri + a3 Betai + a4 CumReti + a5 StdReti         
                                         + a6 MinReti + a7 BioTechi + a8 CompHardi + a9 CompSofti         
                                         + a10 Electronicsi + a11Retaili + εi)      
 
 Variable Coefficient p-value 
Intercept –3.993 <0.001 
LogMVE 0.171 <0.001 
Turnover 13.317 <0.001 
Beta 0.106 <0.001 
CumRet –0.285 <0.001 
StdRet                   –5.676 <0.001 
MinRet –3.759 <0.001 
BioTech –0.087 0.255 
CompHard 0.180 0.024 
CompSoft 0.127 0.015 
Electronics 0.025 0.698 
Retail  0.015 0.831 
McFadden Pseudo R2 28.1% 
789 litigated and 55,329 non-litigated firm-year observations 
                                       
Variable Definitions: The dependent variable Lawsuit is 1 for a firm-year if the firm is the defendant in a 
class-action lawsuit filed in that year and 0 otherwise. For a litigated firm-year, the independent variables 
are measured in the one-year period before the filing date; for a non-litigated firm-year they are measured 
over the calendar year. LogMVE is the log transformation of average daily market value of equity (in 
millions of dollars). Turnover is the average daily trading volume deflated by the number of shares 
outstanding. Beta is the coefficient on market returns in the market model. CumRet is the sum of daily 
returns. StdRet is the standard deviation of daily returns. MinRet is the minimum daily return. BioTech, 
CompHard, CompSoft, Electronics, and Retail are the dummy variables for the bio-tech (SIC 2833-2836), 
computer hardware (SIC 3570-3577), computer software (SIC 7371-7379), electronics (SIC 3600-3674), 
and retail (SIC 5200-5961) industries, respectively.      
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APPENDIX C 
Examples of Forward-looking Disclosures other than Earnings or Sales Guidance 
A. Operational Changes (e.g. restructuring plans, new store openings, acquisitions or disposals 
of business units.) 
“By fiscal year-end, the Company plans to operate 360 Abercrombie & Fitch stores, 163 
Abercrombie stores, 318 Hollister stores, and eight RUEHL stores.” --“Abercrombie & Fitch Reports 
Third Quarter Results,” press release, 11/15/2005, company website.  
B. Estimates of Key Drivers for Earnings (e.g. profit margins, segment sales, expenses, tax rate) 
“AMO continues to expect its global eye care franchise to grow annually at a rate of 1 percent to 3 
percent, excluding the impacts of currency.” -- “Advanced Medical Optics Announced First-Quarter 
2005 Results,” press release, 4/28/2005, PR Newswire.   
C. New Products or Services (e.g. prospective products or services, drugs in the FDA approval 
process) 
"In the first quarter, we made our digital CAD mammography solution available through Hologic," 
continued Parr. "iCAD also received FDA approval to expand Second Look Digital for use with 
Siemens' full-field digital system, which we expect to contribute to sales in future quarters. 
Additionally, we filed our first application with the FDA for approval of a product to support 
radiologists in review of Computed Tomography (CT) studies of the chest, and detection of 
potentially cancerous lung nodules." --“iCAD Reports earnings in First Quarter 2005,” press release, 
4/28/2005, PR Newswire.  
D: Capital Expenditure 
“Our capital expenditures for the year are targeted at $1.5 billion to $1.6 billion.” -- “McDonald's 
Ends Year with Strong Performance,” press release, 1/26/2004, PR Newswire.   
E: R&D Spending 
“We anticipate research and development expenses to increase in future quarters as activities related 
to nebivolol progress.” --Mylan Reports Record First Quarter Revenue and Earnings, press release, 
7/25/2002, Business Wire.   
F:  Financing Plans (e.g. debts, stock repurchases, change in dividend policy) 
“The company also said that a new asset-based $600 million five-year, senior secured revolving credit 
facility is expected to close early in the fourth quarter. The new facility will replace the current $300 
million credit facility. The new credit facility is expected to provide Maytag with substantially more 
financial capacity and flexibility to meet its 2006 debt maturities and its long-term financing 
requirements. Maytag would have the ability to increase the new credit facility by $150 million to 
$750 million.” -- “Maytag Announces Third Quarter Results,” press release, 10/21/2005, PR 
Newswire.  
G: Estimated Effect of Legal Actions 
"The Gorilla V contract dispute with BP continues. Final arguments in the London trial were heard 
October 2nd, 3rd and 4th and a court decision should be handed down before year end. The Harris 
County, Texas litigation remains in the discovery phase though the trial date has again been 
postponed, possibly until the second quarter of next year. We remain confident of a favorable 
outcome." -- “Rowan Reports Third Quarter Financial Results,” press release, 10/17/2001, PR 
Newswire.   
H:  Firm’s forecast of Industry Factors 
“The company has revised its forecast for U.S. industry demand for the year to 5 percent from 2 
percent growth, based on current economic projections and consumer spending trends.”  
-- “Whirlpool Corp. Reports First Quarter 2002 Results,” press release, 4/17/2002, Business Wire.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Collection 
 
 
 
 
Procedures 
Unique
Firms 
Sample 
Period 
The sample period is 2002Q1-2005Q1.  Each quarter is referred to 
as an “event quarter.” The number of firm quarters covered by 
Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S is 42,692. a 
4,576 
Firms that issued earnings guidance for at least three out of the 
four quarters before the event quarter (“pre-event”) and issued no 
guidance for the event quarter and its subsequent three quarters 
(these four quarters are referred to as “post-event”) according to 
the First Call Company Issued Guidelines database.b  
 
353 
Exclude firms that in fact issued guidance for the four post-event 
quarters according to our news search in Factiva.  (94) 
Exclude firms whose first quiet quarter was beyond the sample 
period, according to our news search in Factiva.  (13) 
Exclude firms that were acquired in the six quarters beginning 
with the event quarter.  (24) 
 
 
 
 
Guidance 
Stoppers 
Guidance stoppers c 222 
Firms that issued earnings guidance for at least three quarters in 
the four pre-event quarters and at least three quarters in the four 
post-event quarters, according to the First Call Company Issued 
Guidelines database.d   
 
699 
Exclude firms that were acquired in the six quarters beginning 
with the event quarter. (23) 
 
 
Guidance 
Maintainers 
 
 Guidance maintainers 676 
 
a: The quarters are calendarized: a firm’s fiscal quarter is labeled to the calendar quarter with which it 
overlaps most. For example, fiscal quarters that end in May, June, and July belong to the second calendar 
quarter.   
b: The term “guidance” in our study does not include pre-announcements—the estimates issued after a 
fiscal quarter end. The number of firm-quarters that satisfy this requirement is 527. For a firm that 
appears in this group for more than one quarter, we choose its earliest quarter. The logic is as follows. 
Suppose a firm issues one guideline for each of the four quarters before Qt and gives no guidance 
afterwards. The number of pre-event guidelines for Qt, Qt+1, Qt+2, Qt+3, and Qt+4 is 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0, 
respectively; the number of post-event guidelines is 0 for all these quarters. As a result, both Qt and Qt+1 
appear in the set of 527 observations, although Qt is the true quarter since when the firm stops providing 
quarterly guidance. 
c: Among these firms, 35 firms stop quarterly guidance at a later quarter in the sample period than the 
quarter identified from the First Call data, according to our news search.    
d: The number of firm-quarters that satisfy this requirement is 5,015. For a firm that appears in this group 
for more than one quarter, we randomly choose a quarter from the qualified quarters as its event quarter.     
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TABLE 2 
Distributions of Guidance Stoppers and Maintainers 
 
Panel A: Fiscal Quarter Distribution 
Event Quarter Stoppers Maintainers 
1st  Fiscal Quarter 85 107 
2nd Fiscal Quarter 48 139 
3rd Fiscal Quarter 26 158 
4th Fiscal Quarter 29 173 
Total 188 577 
Note: For this table we exclude 34 stoppers and 99 maintainers whose event quarter is 2005Q1.    
 
Panel B: Calendar Year-Quarter Distribution 
Year Quarter Stoppers Maintainers 
2002 1 27 30 
2002 2 11 33 
2002 3 9 24 
2002 4 9 44 
2003 1 36 29 
2003 2 27 46 
2003 3 10 44 
2003 4 10 61 
2004 1 18 62 
2004 2 9 51 
2004 3 12 67 
2004 4 10 86 
2005 1 34 99 
Total 222 676 
Note: A firm’s fiscal quarter is labeled to the calendar quarter with which it overlaps most. For 
example, fiscal quarters ending in May, June, and July belong to the second calendar quarter.   
 
Panel C: Top-Ten Industry (2-digit SIC) Distribution 
Guidance Stoppers (222) Guidance Maintainers (676) 
Obs. SIC Industry  Obs. SIC Industry  
20   73 Business Services 145 73 Business Services 
16 36 Electric Equipment 64 36 Electric Equipment 
16 28 Chemical Products 51 38 Measurement Equipment 
11 49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 50 35 Machinery and Computers 
11 38 Measurement Equipment 28 28 Chemical Products 
9 20 Food Products 25 59 Retail 
8 35 Machinery and Computers 25 56 Apparel 
7 58 Eating and Drinking Services 18 58 Eating and Drinking Services 
7 56 Apparel 17 87 Engineering and R&D Services 
6 80 Health Services 17 50 Wholesale 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Stoppers Maintainers Between-Group 
 Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median T-Test Wilcoxon 
∆EPS 218 –0.005 –0.011 675 0.002 –0.008  –1.55 –3.33*** 
MBanalyst 222 0.692 0.750 676 0.833 1.000 –6.70*** –7.14*** 
FutureEPS 222 –0.001 0.002 675 0.006 0.003  –1.11 –3.13*** 
Loss 222 0.276 0.125 676 0.179 0.000   3.74***  4.08*** 
Return 218 –0.243 –0.311 669 –0.002 –0.100  –4.94*** –5.59*** 
Management 222     0.198 676 0.087 χ2=20.25 
IndNo 222 0.541 0.527 676 0.522 0.500    1.35     1.52 
Dispersion 211 0.0019 0.0008 647 0.0009 0.0005  2.28**  4.87*** 
FutureVAR 222 0.008 0.002 675 0.002 0.002    1.18   0.04 
Litigation 218 0.021 0.013 669 0.017 0.010  2.35**  3.00*** 
MVE 222 5,539 809 675 4,796 975    0.46 –1.99** 
Analyst 222 7.50 5.63 676     8.87 7.00  –2.95*** –2.99*** 
Volatility 218 0.023 0.019 669 0.022 0.019    1.26   0.48 
ChgCAP 192 0.0007 0.0003 643 –0.0003   0.0009    0.47 –0.24 
ChgR&D 87 0.0031 0.0005 357 0.0003 0.0005    2.04**   1.85* 
ChgAnalyst 222 –0.073 0.000 676 0.699 0.750 –5.01*** –5.06*** 
ChgDisper 205 0.0004 0.0003 640 0.0001 0.000     0.76   6.49*** 
ChgError 218 0.0010 0.0004 673 0.0005 0.0001    0.80  2.58*** 
 
Notes: 
1.  “***,” “**,” and “*” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-
tailed test, respectively.  
2. Variable definitions: 
∆EPS is the change in diluted earnings per share (split-adjusted) from the same quarter in the 
prior year, averaged in the four pre-event quarters and deflated by the stock price at the beginning 
of the pre-event period. 
MBanalyst is the proportion of quarters in the four pre-event quarters for which a firm meets or 
beats the most recent analyst consensus compiled before the earnings announcement. 
FutureEPS is the change in average diluted earnings per share (split-adjusted) from the four pre-
event quarters to the four post-event quarters, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the 
pre-event period. 
Loss is the proportion of quarters in a sample firm’s four pre-event quarters in which the firm has 
a loss (i.e. negative diluted earnings per share, from Compustat). 
Return is the buy-and-hold return (compounding monthly) in the one-year period that ends with 
the month of the earnings announcement for the quarter preceding the event quarter, subtracted 
by the buy-and-hold return of the equal-weighted market index during the same period. 
Management takes the value of 1 if a firm has changed or announced a change in the CEO or 
CFO in the six months before the fiscal quarter end of the event quarter and 0 otherwise. The 
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contingency-table chi-square statistic is reported for the between-group test and is significant at 
the 1% level.   
IndNo is the proportion of firms in a sample firm’s industry (2-digit SIC) that do not issue any 
quarterly guidance for the four quarters before the sample firm’s event quarter. 
Dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst quarterly earnings forecasts included in the most 
recent consensus before the earnings announcement, averaged in the four pre-event quarters and 
deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the pre-event period. 
FutureVAR is the change from the four pre-event to the four post-event quarters in the sum of the 
absolute deviation of the quarterly EPS from the EPS in the same quarter of the year before the 
pre-event period, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the pre-event period. Note that 
the benchmarks for both the pre- and post-event quarters are the same: the seasonal quarter in the 
year before the pre-event period.  
Litigation is the estimated probability of being sued by using the litigation model in Appendix B 
out of sample, where the input variables are measured in the one-year period before the beginning 
of the event quarter. 
MVE is the market value of equity at the beginning of the event quarter (in millions of dollars).  
LogMVE is its natural logarithm.    
Analyst is the number of analysts whose forecasts are included in the most recent consensus 
before a firm’s quarterly earnings announcement, averaged in the four pre-event quarters. If a 
firm-quarter is covered by Compustat but not by I/B/E/S, analyst following for that firm-quarter 
is considered 0. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns in the one-year period that ends five days after 
the earnings announcement for the quarter preceding the event quarter, subtracted by the standard 
deviation of the equal-weighted market return during the same period. 
ChgCAP is the change in average abnormal capital expenditures (Compustat #90) and R&D 
(Compustat #4) from the four pre-event quarters to the event and the subsequent seven quarters. 
ChgR&D is the change in average abnormal R&D from the four pre-event quarters to the event 
and the subsequent seven quarters. For each measure the normal level in each quarter is the ratio 
of the industry sum of CAPEX over the sum of the beginning-of-quarter total assets of the firms 
in the industry, multiplied by the firm’s beginning-of-quarter assets. The abnormal intensity 
measure in each quarter is the actual level minus the normal level, scaled by the beginning-of-
quarter total assets. We label the average abnormal capital expenditures plus R&D in the pre-
event period as “CAP” and the R&D only in the pre-event period as “R&D.”  
ChgAnalyst is the change in average analyst following (see the definition of Analyst) from the 
four pre-event quarters to the four post-event quarters. 
ChgDisper is the change in average analyst forecast dispersion (see the definition of Dispersion) 
from the four pre-event quarters to the four post-event quarters. 
ChgError is the change in analyst forecast error from the four pre-event quarters to the post-event 
quarters. Forecast error in each quarter is the absolute difference between realized earnings and 
the most recent analyst consensus before the earnings announcement (both from I/B/E/S), 
deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the pre-event period. We label the forecast error in 
the pre-event period as “Error.”   
An observation is dropped if the split-adjusted price deflator is less than 1. 
TABLE 4 
Firm Performance and Earnings Guidance Cessation 
Logit Model (z-statistic appears in parenthesis): 
Pr (Stop =1) = F(a0 + a1∆EPS + a2 MBanalyst + a3 FutureEPS + a4 Loss + a5 Return 
                + a6 Management + a7 IndNo + a8 Dispersion + a9 FutureVAR + a10 Litigation 
                + a11 LogMVE + a12 Analyst + a13 Volatility + quarterly dummies + ε) 
Logit Model  Estimation (1)          Estimation (2) 
Intercept               –1.723* 
              (–1.84) 
            –1.776* 
             (–1.89) 
∆EPS        –9.739*** 
              (–2.65) 
       –11.186*** 
              (–2.89) 
MBanalyst       –1.751*** 
              (–4.15) 
      –1.753*** 
             (–4.15) 
FutureEPS              –5.237** 
              (–2.14) 
           
Loss                0.659* 
               (1.70) 
              0.602 
              (1.56) 
Return              –0.562** 
              (–2.29) 
            –0.648*** 
             (–2.62) 
Management                0.974*** 
               (3.73) 
              0.989*** 
              (3.77) 
IndNo                1.270** 
               (2.14) 
              1.262** 
              (2.12) 
Dispersion              313.408*** 
               (4.45) 
            304.089*** 
              (4.51) 
FutureVAR                           6.895** 
              (2.39) 
Litigation                1.038** 
               (1.97) 
              0.985* 
              (1.86) 
LogMVE                0.099 
               (0.90) 
              0.105 
              (0.95) 
Analyst              –0.060** 
             (–2.51) 
            –0.060** 
            (–2.52) 
Volatility             –23.787** 
             (–1.96) 
           –22.256* 
            (–1.83) 
LR Test  χ2               200.20             201.74 
McFadden Pseudo R2                21.2%              21.4% 
See variable definitions in Table 3. The estimation uses 208 stoppers and 640 maintainers that 
have available data. “***,” “**,” and “*” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. The fractional rankings of Litigation (between 0 and 1 
with the highest value being 1) are used. The quarterly dummy coefficients are suppressed.  
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TABLE 5 
Earnings Performance Quarter by Quarter 
 
Panel A: Guidance Stoppers (222) 
  
 Qt-4 Qt-3 Qt-2 Qt-1 Qt Qt+1 Qt+2 Qt+3 
Loss 54 
(24.3%) 
55 
(24.8%) 
63 
(28.4%)
72 
(32.4%)
64 
(28.8%)
67 
(30.2%)
62 
(27.9%) 
62 
(27.9%)
EPS 
Decrease 
87 
(39.2%) 
83 
(37.4%) 
104 
(46.8%)
116 
(52.3%)
104 
(46.8%)
104 
(46.8%)
89 
(40.1%) 
79 
(35.6%)
Meet/Beat 168 
(75.7%) 
157 
(70.7%) 
143 
(64.4%)
141 
(63.5%)
146 
(65.8%)
133 
(59.9%)
136 
(61.3%) 
139 
(62.6%)
 
 
Panel B: Guidance Maintainers (676) 
 
 Qt-4 Qt-3 Qt-2 Qt-1 Qt Qt+1 Qt+2 Qt+3 
Loss 125 
(18.5%) 
119 
(17.6%) 
123 
(18.2%)
116 
(17.2%)
100 
(14.8%)
98 
(14.5%)
97 
(14.3%) 
103 
(15.2%)
EPS 
Decrease 
228 
(33.7%) 
232 
(34.3%) 
198 
(29.3%)
215 
(31.8%)
217 
(32.1%)
198 
(29.3%)
208 
(30.8%) 
219 
(32.4%)
Meet/Beat 542 
(80.2%) 
560 
(82.8%) 
564 
(83.4%)
559 
(82.7%)
561 
(83.0%)
569 
(84.2%)
533 
(78.8%) 
528 
(78.1%)
 
Note: Qt is the event quarter. The tables show the number of firms (percentage in parenthesis) that 
have losses (i.e. negative diluted earnings per share, from Compustat), experience a decrease in 
diluted earnings per share (from Compustat) from the same quarter in the prior year after split 
adjustment, and meet or beat analysts’ most recent consensus compiled before the earnings 
announcement (both realized and forecasted earnings are obtained from I/B/E/S), respectively.    
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TABLE 6 
Guidance Stoppers: To Announce or Not to Announce? 
Logit Model: 
Pr (Announce =1) = F(a0 + a1∆EPS + a2 MBanalyst + a3 FutureEPS + a4 Return 
                                         + a5 Management + a6 IndNo + a7 Dispersion 
                                         + a8 Litigation + a9 Analyst + a10 Volatility + ε) 
 Variable Coefficient z-statistic 
Intercept 0.245 0.16 
∆EPS         17.226  1.58* 
MBanalyst 0.462 0.37 
FutureEPS 4.654 0.60 
Return         –1.024          –1.30* 
Management 0.957    1.67** 
IndNo         –2.782          –2.01*** 
Dispersion     –451.359          –1.37* 
Litigation         –1.499          –1.16 
Analyst         –0.006          –0.11 
Volatility       –27.421          –1.06 
LR Test  χ2          20.35 
McFadden pseudo R2          16.2% 
     
See the stopper-announcer list in Appendix A. For this test we exclude six announcers who 
announced unusually early or late to avoid misclassifications of pre- and post-event periods in 
the test. The estimation uses 19 announcer-stoppers and 183 non-announcer stoppers that 
have available data for this test. See variable definitions in Table 3. The fractional rankings of 
Litigation (between 0 and 1 with the highest value being 1) are used. “***,” “**,” and “*” 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a one-tailed test, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
Change in Long-Term Investments after Quarterly Guidance Cessation 
Model (2): Capital Expenditures plus R&D Expenditures 
ChgCAP = b0 + b1 Stop + b2 ChgROA + b3 M/B + b4 OCF + b5 M/B*OCF + b6 Leverage 
                       + b7 LogMVE + b8 CAP + ε   
 
Model (3): R&D Expenditures only 
ChgR&D = c0 + c1 Stop + c2 ChgROA + c3 M/B + c4 OCF + c5 M/B*OCF + c6 Leverage 
                       + c7 LogMVE + c8 R&D + ε 
 ChgCAP ChgR&D 
 Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Intercept   0.0025     1.02       0.0053           3.88*** 
Stop     –0.0011        –0.90       0.0014    3.13*** 
ChgROA  0.0381    2.80***     –0.0127   –1.28 
M/B  0.0005  2.10**       0.0000     0.45 
OCF    –0.0147   –0.92     –0.0749   –6.17*** 
M/B*OCF      0.0051  1.96**       0.0014     1.32 
Leverage    –0.0049   –2.12**     –0.0006   –0.54 
LogMVE    –0.0001   –0.35     –0.0005   –3.05*** 
CAP     –0.2478  –14.44***   
R&D        –0.1224   –8.39*** 
Model-Test F statistic 55.26 51.55 
Stoppers/Maintainers 174 / 611 77 / 336 
Adjusted R2 30.2% 21.6% 
 
Notes:  
1. For this table we redefine the post-event period as the event quarter and its subsequent 
seven quarters. Model (2) uses the firms that have positive capital expenditures (including 
R&D) in either the pre- or post-event period. Model (3) uses the firms that have positive 
R&D in either the pre- or post-event period. 
2. ChgROA is the change in average accounting return on assets from the pre- to post-event 
period. M/B is the market to book ratio at the end of the pre-event period. OCF is the 
average operating cash flow as a percentage of total assets in the pre-event period. 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities over total assets at the end of the pre-event period. 
LogMVE is the natural logarithm of MVE. See other variable definitions in Table 3.  
3. Outliers (i.e., studentized residual above two in absolute value, see Belsely et al. (1980)) 
are deleted. The t statistics are robust to within-industry error correlations.  
4.   “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a 
two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
TABLE 8 
Change of alternative Forward-looking Disclosures 
after Quarterly Guidance Cessation 
 
Panel A: Forward-looking disclosures in the pre-quarter (Excluding annual earnings or 
sales guidance) 
 
Number of Firms Category Description of Disclosures 0 1 2 3 4 >=5
A Operational changes 22 30 19 8 9 9 
B Estimates of key drivers for earnings 22 15 8 12 13 27 
C New products or services 70 17 5 1 1 3 
D Capital expenditures 47 36 8 6   
E R&D Spending 88 5 3 1   
F Financing plans 52 33 6 3 2 1 
G Estimated effect of legal actions  86 11     
H Firm’s forecast of industry factors 65 22 5 3 1 1 
 All forward-looking disclosures 2 6 6 5 9 69 
 
Panel B: Forward-looking disclosures in the post-quarter (Excluding annual earnings or 
sales guidance) 
 
Number of Firms Code Description of Disclosures 0 1 2 3 4 >=5
A Operational changes 33 26 20 2 8 8 
B Estimates of key drivers for earnings 19 15 18 16 4 25 
C New products or services 78 12 4 1  2 
D Capital expenditures 32 39 20 5 1  
   E R&D Spending 89 6 2    
F Financing plans 60 22 13 2   
G Estimated effect of legal actions  93 2 2    
H Firm’s forecast of industry factors 76 12 4 5   
 All forward-looking disclosures 4 5 6 5 12 65 
 
Panel C: Change in alternative forward-looking disclosures from the pre- to post-quarter 
 
 # of Firms Mean Median 
Decrease 46 –3.63 –3 
No Change 21 N/A N/A 
Increase 30 2.57 2 
 
All 97 Stoppers 
 T-test: t = –2.64  
Two-tailed p = 0.010)
 (Signed Rank Test:  
Two-tailed p=0.009) 
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TABLE 8 
 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Guidance about fiscal-year earnings or sales 
 
Pre-Event Period Post-Event Period # of Firms 
YES YES 69 
YES NO 12 
NO YES 3 
NO NO 13 
 97 
 
Notes:  
1. Guidance stoppers issued earnings guidance for at least three out of four consecutive quarters 
and then issued no guidance for at least four consecutive quarters. The first quarter for which 
a stopper becomes quiet is referred to as the “event quarter”; the four quarters before the 
event quarter are referred to as the “pre-event period”; the four quiet quarters starting with the 
event quarter are referred to as the “post-event period.”   
2. We randomly select 100 firms from guidance stoppers and for each firm we randomly select a 
quarter in its post-event period, referred to as the “post-quarter.” We then select the same 
fiscal quarter in the pre-event period, referred to as the “pre-quarter.” If the pre-quarter is the 
quarter right before the event quarter, we replace it with the same fiscal quarter in the prior 
year. We do so because quarterly guidance is often issued in the previous-quarter earnings 
announcement; therefore, the earnings announcement press release for the quarter right 
before the event quarter probably resembles press releases for the post-event period rather 
than for the pre-event period. We drop three firms that do not have the earnings 
announcement press release for both the pre-quarter and post-quarter.  
3. For each firm-quarter we code the forward-looking disclosures from four sources: (1) the 
earnings announcement press release, (2) the MD&A section of 10-Q, (3) the earnings 
announcement conference call (the presentation portion), and (4) special press releases issued 
between the prior-quarter earnings announcement date and the fiscal end of the quarter. 
Among the 97 firms, 18 firms do not have MD&A because 10-Qs are not filed for the fourth 
fiscal quarter, and for another firm its 10-Q was not found. For 24 firms the conference call 
transcripts were not found for both the pre-quarter and post-quarter.   
4. In Panels A and B, the columns indicate the total number of disclosures per company from 
the four sources. For example, the first row of Panel A indicates that in the pre-quarter 22 
firms gave no information about operational changes, 30 firms gave one disclosure of this 
type, and 19 firms gave two disclosures.    
5. In Panel D, for each period a firm is in the “YES” group if it issued guidance about fiscal-
year earnings or sales according to either the CIG database or our reading of the files from the 
four information sources.   
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TABLE 9 
Changes in Analyst Activities after Quarterly Guidance Cessation 
Model (4): Analyst Following 
ChgAnalyst = d0 + d1Stop + d2Return + d3FutureEPS + d4 LogMVE + d5 Analyst + ε          
 
Model (5): Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
ChgDisper = e0 + e1Stop + e2FutureEPS + e3|FutureEPS| + e4LogMVE + e5Dispersion + ε 
 
Model (6): Analyst Forecast Error 
ChgError = f0 + f1 Stop + f2 FutureEPS + f3 |FutureEPS| + f4 LogMVE + f5 Error + ε             
 
Robust-Regression Estimations (t-statistic appears in parenthesis).  
 ChgAnalyst ChgDisper ChgError 
Intercept    –0.614** 
       (–1.98) 
   0.0005*** 
        (7.16) 
   0.0010*** 
      (5.77) 
Stop     –0.577*** 
        (–3.95) 
     0.0002*** 
        (6.55) 
    0.0003*** 
       (3.35) 
Return      0.595*** 
         (6.72) 
            
FutureEPS           0.658 
          (0.48) 
      –0.0026*** 
       (–5.91) 
     –0.0039*** 
      (–3.78) 
|FutureEPS|            0.0020*** 
        (4.23)     
      0.0112*** 
        (9.67)     
LogMVE      0.241*** 
         (4.61) 
     –0.0000*** 
       (–4.29) 
     –0.0001*** 
       (–3.44) 
Analyst (Model 4) 
Dispersion (Model 5) 
Error (Model 6) 
    –0.049*** 
        (–3.68) 
     –0.3353*** 
       (–33.05) 
     –0.3658*** 
      (–61.15) 
Model-Test F statistic 21.13 265.07 785.68 
Stoppers 
Maintainers 
218 
668 
205 
640 
218 
673 
 
Notes:  
1. The robust-regression estimation is robust to outliers in the dependent and independent 
variables by automatically, in each iteration, setting aside influential observations and 
downweighting the observations that have large residuals. This method does not assume 
normality and theoretically possesses about 95% of the efficiency of OLS. The Belsley et al. 
(1980) outlier treatment when outliers (i.e., studentized residual above two in absolute value) 
are removed yields similar results.   
2. “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-
tailed test, respectively. 
3. See variable definitions in Table 3. |FutureEPS| is the absolute value of FutureEPS.  
